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On the evening of March 26, 2010, a South Korean Navy's 1,200t frigate Cheonan sank 
off the country's west coastthe waters controlled by the South Korean Navy, between 
Baengnyeong and Daecheong Islandkilling 46 out of 104 personnel on board. The ROK 
government recovered the hull and formed a Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group 
(JIG), and has since investigated the cause of theincident. On May 20, 2010, 
government has finally concluded that "the Cheonan had been sunk by the North 
Korean torpedo attack." Subsequently on May 24, South Korean President Lee 
Myung-bak released a public statement clarifying that "the Cheonan sinking had been 
committed by North Korea (DPRK)," and that South Korea "will firmly deal with the 
situation" so that the DPRK will "pay proper consequences for her action."
1. South Korea's Sanctions against North Korea and the Consequences
The May 24th public statement has illuminated that South Korea's policy on defense and 
diplomacy as along with policies toward North Korea will shift considerably after the 
incident. First, policies on defense and security have intensified in the direction of 
imposing sanctions against North Korea, particularly since the presidential statement 
was released. At a joint press conference with Minister of Reunification, Minister of 
Diplomacy and Minister of Defense, Minister of Diplomacy Yoo Myung-hwan said that 
"[the South Korean government] will respond with all possible diplomatic measures in 
close cooperation with her allies, friends, major states concerned as well as international 
organizations." Minister Yoo moreover alluded to imposing additional embargos, i.e. 
prohibition on entering, investing in, and sending aid to the DPRK. Amidst doubts 
surrounding the South Korean government's official report on theinvestigation, the Lee 
administration has mobilized all possible economic, military, psychological and 
diplomatic measures to sanction North Korea. Since inauguration, the top priority task 
of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula has been overlooked. Sprouted by the Cheonan 
sinking, MB's punitive policy against North Korea has quickly become a top priority for 
policy agenda. Amidst his efforts was securing cooperation of China and Russia as well 
as ratification of a punitive resolution at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). 
MB's "Cheonan diplomacy"primarily required a strong support from the United 
States which would then buttress other diplomatic efforts. A "2+2" ministerial 
conference on defense and diplomacy was held for the first time between the two 
nations to display the bilateral collaboration. However, American support came at an 
expense. On June 24, 2010, President Lee met with President Barack Obama at the 
fourth G20 Summit in Toronto, Canada. President Obama expressed particular interest 
in discussing the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) by affirming, "When we 
visit Korea in November we wish to make a leap forward and to submit the agreement 
to the Congress in just a few months' time."Accordingly, President Lee replied that 
"South Korea welcomes President Obama's proposition."President Lee moreover said 
that "the ROK agrees entirely with the UN resolution on denuclearization of Iran, and it 
wishes to actively participate in the implementation process." In case South Korea joins 
the collective effort against Iran, the nation's economic and diplomatic cost is expected 
to be high. Thus so far, the U.S. has displayed full support for the Lee administration's 
embargos against the DPRK, seeking in return South Korea's cooperation in the 
re-negotiation of the Korea-U.S. FTA, joint embargo against Iran, dispatching of troops 
to Afghanistan, etc. 
The ROK government's diplomatic effort in renouncing the DPRK for sinking 
the Cheonan resulted in adoptinga statement at the UNSC. The Lee administration 
seems to have adopted as priority goals of Cheonan diplomacy, or as a condition for 
inter-Korean dialogue, the DPRK's apology for the Cheonan incident, punishment of the 
chiefs of staff, and prevention of recurrence. The official staff under President Lee after 
the release of the May 24th statement has often implied the administration's pursuit in 
adopting a UNSC resolution ratifying sanctions against the DPRK. Nevertheless, 
following the June 2 local elections and Vice Minister of Diplomacy Chun Yung-woo's 
visit to the U.S., the ROK administration's Cheonan diplomacy has downward adjusted 
its set of goals to secure a unanimous statement at the UNSC. As predetermined, on July 
9, 2010, the 15 members of the UNSC have adopted a UNSC Presidential Statement, 
composed of South Korea's compromise and the international society's concerns and 
expectations. A Presidential Statement as such drafted and adopted is neither a 
collective victory nor a step towards mutual interest. Given this, what must be noted is 
the content under Article 10, which states, "The Security Council calls for full 
adherence to the Korean Armistice Agreement and encourages the settlement of 
outstanding issues on the Korean peninsula by peaceful means to resume direct dialogue 
and negotiation through appropriate channels as early as possible, with a view to 
avoiding conflicts and averting escalation." In spite of the effort, such vindictive 
approach as the policy set forth by the Lee administration to exclude the DPRK from 
the international arena has faced with the callous political reality. Adopting a resolution 
that renounces the DPRK at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was even more 
difficult than it was at the UNSC, with North Korea as a friendly member of the group. 
Presidential Statement with regards to the Cheonan incident was finally adopted at the 
17thARF held in Hanoi, Vietnam on July 24, 2010. The Statement was a blunt 
expression of support for the UNSC Presidential Statement and a return to the Six-party 
Talks.
The Lee administration's Cheonan diplomacy based on a series of sanctions 
against North Korea once hit a deadlock called China and Russia, nearly falling 
through. China and Russia have already been adamant against the punitive atmosphere 
toward North Korea. On May 20, 2010, ever since the JIG report was released, China 
has clearly urged that "both nations objectively, and in a refined manner, cope with the 
problem at hand so as not to intensify the tension on the Korean peninsula," displaying 
the conflict of opinion with South Korea. Likewise, Russia has since the early stages of 
the incident been aloof from MB's disposition, pulling out its team of investigation from 
identifying the cause of the sinking for which the country was invited on the ROK 
government's request. Russia'sreport to the U.S. and China of the investigation was later 
found to be in conflict with the results concluded by the ROK government.
Cheonan diplomacy pursued by the Lee administration has been a reminder of 
the fact that the Korean peninsula is still one of the conflict-stricken regions and distrust 
and tension are still prevalent between the two Koreas. On the other hand, the 
administration has been consistent with its punitive line of measures, free from the 
frustration of causing expenses in accordance with the policy, i.e. American demands of 
commercial and security exchanges, and conflict with China and Russia. At the end of 
the day, the question is whether bringing tension upon the peninsula as well as all of 
East Asia and generating conflict with neighboring states for the sole purpose of 
containing the DPRK deserves the name "pragmatic diplomacy." Especially if the Lee 
administrationwhile wholly reliant on American allydismisses the significance of the 
relationship with China and Russia as a meretool for securing support in its policy 
toward the DPRK, this would be an example of how wishful thinking fails in the 
cold-hearted world of international politics. 
2. The Worst-ever Inter-Korean Relation
Second, the ROK government's punitive measuresagainst the DPRK backed by 
the president's statement on May 24 led the inter-Korean relationship into an even 
deeper slump. After the Cheonan incident, the relationship has been symmetric with a 
typical chicken game. South Korea's public announcement of its policy of sanctions in 
all aspects against the DPRK has outraged the nation. Prohibiting contact with South 
Koreans, capturing South Korean fishing boat, military training near the Northern Limit 
Line (NLL) are examples of the DPRK's stance since MB's public statement in May. On 
the other hand, North Korea consistently has tried to loosen up the pressure of Lee 
administration, initially focusing on trivializing South Korea's attempt to adopt an 
embargo against the DPRK at the UNSC. On August 25-27, 2010, North Korea 
permitted former U.S. president Jimmy Carter's visit for the homecoming of Aijalon M. 
Gomez, a then American prisoner of the DPRK, back to the U.S. However Chairman 
Kim Jong-il neglected Mr. Carter in favor of a summit with President of the People's 
Republic of China Hu Jintao on August 27. The apparent double standard in North 
Korea's policy line displays the country's attempt to escape from South Korea's 
sanctions and to avoid international isolation which particularly intensified with the 
Cheonan sinking.
One of the results of North Korea's response was a little shift in South 
Korea's policy toward the DPRK. The Lee administration has begun seeking dialogues, 
which seemed to have crystallized into a series of inter-Korean talks since August of 
2009. The cause then was the flood damage in North Korea, and accordingly the South 
Korean government delivered on August 26 its aid in the rehabilitation process. On the 
31st, the Lee administration expressed its intent on aid to north that amounts to a 10,000 
million won. On September 4, Chosun Red Cross groups of North Korea sent a letter of 
request to south, listing rice and cement for the process of rehabilitation. Moreover on 
the 7th, the South Korean fishing boat and the seven members of the crew that were held 
captives by the DPRK were returned to their home across the NLL of East Sea. On 
September 17, at an inter-Korean meeting within the Red Cross, North Korea proposed 
a reunion of 100 separated families in Mt. Kumgang District in late October. At this 
juncture, the two Koreas have set the date on October 30, 2010 for the planned reunion. 
Unfortunately, Minister of Reunification Hyun In-taek pronounced that the 
administration is still adamant on its policy toward North Korea, the so-called 
"Denuclearization·Opening·3000." Through a series of contact with northit was found 
that North Korea's anger with South Korea's demand of apologies for the Cheonan 
sinking and a promise of non-recurrence was the main obstacle in the inter-Korean 
dialogue. It seems that the brief series of talks in 2010 are not likely to continue, just 
like the previous year.
In a nutshell, the inter-Korean relationship has deteriorated since MB took 
office in 2008, as the South Korean government has neglected the inter-Korean 
agreement and demanded unilateral denuclearization of North Korea. The times are ripe 
for exit strategy, but a good excuse and the right circumstances are yet to come.
3. A Dead-end Relationship between the U.S. and the DPRK
Whereas the U.S.-North Korean relationship has improved since the 
disablement stage of nuclear facilities in North Korea in 2008, it has faced more 
obstacles in 2009 with the second missile testing and exacerbated after the 
Cheonansinking. This trend clearly displays the codependence between the inter-Korean 
relationship and the U.S.-North Korean relationship. Paradoxically, American relations 
with North Korea have worsened since the inauguration of President Obama, who has 
persistently renounced the Bush administration's unilateral diplomacy and emphasized 
the significance of dialogue.
Ever since the second nuclear test on May 25, 2009, the U.S. has 
pushed for an embargo on North Korea. Under such circumstances, the Obama 
administration was unable to take lead in talks with the DPRK. On July 22, 2009 at the 
ARF held in Thailand, Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton made public America' 
official stance, mentioningthat an irreversible denuclearization of North Korea is a 
necessary condition for normalization of its relations with the U.S. Credit is due to her 
for bringing up the issue of normalizing relations before anyone else given the recent 
missile launch and nuclear test. Still, such outlook was only conditional upon "if the 
DPRK agrees to a complete and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea."Of 
course, Secretary Clinton has already made clear that "the U.S. and her partners will 
proceed with a package deal including compensation and normalization of their 
relations with the DPRK, only if the DPRK renders an irreversible 
denuclearization,"thereby alluding to the inclusion of a normalization deal in the 
package. At that point Clinton emphasized that her statements are officially agreed by 
the other four parties of the Six-party Talks, excluding North Korea. Nonetheless, the 
American stance was in accordance with MB's inclusive "Grand Bargain"approach 
which also assumed denuclearization of North Korea as a necessary condition. Both 
administrations were consistent with that North Korea firstly proceeds with 
denuclearization. Clinton, on October 21 the same year, once again insured that the 
U.S.-North Korean relationship will not resume until the DPRK carries out 
denuclearization. It was her most candid rendition of the Obama administration's policy 
toward North Korea. She particularly said "relations with North Korea will resume only 
after a complete denuclearization will be achieved through verifiable and irreversible 
measures," which is deemed to be a mutual agreement with South Korea.
At the end of the day, the Obama administration's policy direction toward North 
Korea is determined under the framework of the U.S.-ROK alliance. Obama's main 
focus renouncing the Bush administration's policy on security and diplomacy was his 
self-righteous stance. In this perspective, upholding the ROK government's stance 
toward North Korea seems to be an obvious choice for the Obama administration and 
with benefits. The Cheonan incident added fuel to the American ambivalence, as Seoul 
is politically situated between Washington and Pyongyang. In such regards, Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell noted at a 
Congressional hearing on September 17, 2010 that "the U.S. will normalize relationship 
with the DPRK upon the resumption of the inter-Korean relations." The statement 
clearly explains that the U.S. will respect the South Korean government's stance as far 
as dialogue with North Korea is concerned. 
In seeing the reality with a sense of balance, we question whether the second 
nuclear test had anything at all to do with North Korea's interest in improving its 
relationship with the U.S. Through a statement released by the Foreign Ministry in the 
DPRK on January 17, 2009, North Korea made a clear distinction between 
normalization of relations and the issue of denuclearization, asserting that "building 
nuclear weapons was not to seek normalization of the U.S.-North Korean relations or 
American economic support, but solely to protect the nation." The statementis 
note-worthy particularly as North Korean response to the approach taken by the 
Department of State in taking on denuclearization as a necessary condition to resume 
dialogue with the DPRK. In fact, North Korea will not be free from the criticism that it 
has exacerbated situations by conducting missile testing and launching, before Obama's 
inauguration and subsequent settlement of policy direction toward North Korea. 
Moreover, based on the outcome of the third representatives conference of the ruling 
Workers' Party on September 28, 2010, North Korea is hardly willing to carry out 
denuclearization. More realistic and long-term policy is needed. 
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